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ABSTRACT

Among the central problems of LDCs is the poor performance of their
public enterprises (PEs), and the limited ability of governments and other
agencies to improve this performance. In practice, a typical funding agency
possesses extremely few levers to improve the performance of an ongoing PE,
with perhaps the most potent lever being negotiation over the conditionality
for original funding.
The present paper suggests a more effective use of
such limited levers.
We propose that project authorities should be asked and induced to
undertake two kinds of pre-commitments at the time of funds approval; a pre
commitment to:
(i) link a non-negligible part of the project's employees'
compensation to the actual PE performance (we call this the "profit-sharing
pre-commitment"), and (ii) liquidate the project if its ex-post performance
falls below some threshold level (we call this the "liquidation pre
commitment"). Inducements might include making the availability and softness
of funding contingent upon such pre-commitments.
We discuss three primary sources of PE losses (namely, conventional
allocational inefficiencies, X-inefficiencies, and project irreversibility
due to "soft budget constraints"), compare the likely relative magnitudes of
associated losses, and argue how incentive pre-commitments would help amel
iorate these losses.
A simple illustration of the likely large order of
magnitude of the "option" value of gains from reversibility is also pre
sented.
This paper places a central emphasis on pre-commitments because, given
the political-economic environment of an LDC, the feasibility of remedial
actions is greatly reduced if provisions for such actions have not already
been agreed upon in advance--and understood by the parties involved--at the
project approval stage. Also, the basic idea of pre-commitments is not in
conflict with other approaches for improving PE performance.
This paper does not take a position on whether PEs are or are not de
sirable. Under the premise that PEs are likey to remain important in LDCs
in the foreseeable future, our objective is to develop some constructive
steps towards improving PE performance. The proposed pre-commitments rep
resent such a step because even though these pre-commitments will not solve
all or most of the problems of PEs, and even though the magnitude of the re
sulting overall benefit would vary across situations, it is difficult to
imagine scenarios where such pre-commitments could actually harm PE perform
ance.
By contrast, many scenarios can be envisioned where incentive pre
commitments and accountability will improve PE performance.

A PROPOSAL FOR USING INCENTIVE PRE-COMMITMENTS
IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE FUNDING
Raaj Kumar Sah and Martin L. Weitzman

Improving the performance of public organizations is a widely felt
need at the present time.

It has been articulated in different political

contexts- - in the socialist economies such as China and the USSR,
mixed economies of LDCs,
America and Western Europe.

in the

and in the market-oriented economies of North
It has also been recognized that economic in-

centives and accountability must play a fundamental role in improving the
performance of public organizations.
The objective of this paper is to propose and argue that the perform
ance of public projects and enterprises in LDCs might be improved if some
modest yet important changes are made in the procedures through which public
projects are initially approved and funded, especially by external funding
organizations.

In particular, we explore the ramifications of having pro-

ject authorities undertake pre-commitments, at the time of project approval,
to link some part of employee compensation to enterprise performance, and to
liquidate the enterprise if its performance falls below some pre-specified
threshold level.

The idea of these pre-commitments is not in conflict with

other approaches for improving the performance of public enterprises;

We

argue that such pre-commitments are likely to have beneficial effects on the
overall returns from public investments.
We begin, in Section I, with a very brief introduction to some of the
problems associated with public enterprises (PEs) in LDCs.

The objective is

2

A comprehensive review is not

only to set the stage for later analysis.

necessary here because the central features of the "public enterprise syn
drome" are sufficiently well known to almost everyone with field experience.

1

In Section II, we discuss the economic nature of three primary sources
of losses in public enterprises:

conventional allocational inefficiencies,

X-inefficiencies, and the irreversibility of projects due to "soft budget
constraints."

We argue that the losses due to irreversibility are likely to

be larger than those due to X-inefficiencies and the latter, in turn, are
likely to be larger than those due to allocational inefficiencies.
In

Section

III,

we

explain why,

and

argue,

that

incentive

pre

commitments might be a possible way of alleviating some of the problems of
This section also illustrates that large gains can be achieved if

PEs.

projects have built-in reversibility (that is, if they can be scaled down or
liquidated when it is socially desirable to do so).
The next two ~ections deal briefly with issues concerning the imple
In Section IV, we discuss the mechanics of

mentation of pre-commitments.
operationalization.

Section V contains a discussion of some objections

which might be raised against pre-commitments of the kind discussed in the
paper.

I.

BACKGROUND

There has been an unambiguous increase in the importance of public
enterprises in LDCs since the mid-1960s.

While PEs account for about 10

percent of the GDP of developed and developing countries taken together,
this percentage is as high as 30 to 40 for several LDCs.

PEs have been
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established by LDC governments for a variety of economic, sociopolitical
and hybrid motives.

Among the presumed reasons have been the desire to

force-draft savings, the desire to bridge the entrepreneurial gap by under
taking projects which might otherwise not be undertaken,

the desire to

control the "commanding heights" of the economy, and the desire to dilute
the concentration· of economic power held by a few large business groups.
Donor agencies' policies have also been a significant influence, particu
larly during the 1970s when several donor organizations appeared to have
exhibited a preference toward PE investment.
It has been increasingly recognized that the rise and the current
importance of PEs in LDCs is best viewed as a consequence of political
economic forces in these countries and throughout the world at large.

For

instance, the "nobler" goals of PEs (such as employment creation, establish
ment of new industries and reduction in the concentration of economic power)
have in the past received, and continue to receive, vocal support from sev
eral segments of the LDC population.

At the same time, the poor performance

of PEs and their cost to the economy--to the extent these costs are visible-have increasingly become a source of popular frustration.

How the scope

and the importance of PEs changes in LDCs in the future would depend in part
on how the political forces supporting different perceptions of PEs balance
one another and, in particular, on what role is played by those organized
groups whose interests are directly affected by PEs.

The premise on which

our present proposals are based is that the proportion of the LDC resources
committed to PEs will remain sizable for the foreseeable future, even though
this proportion may undergo some decline from the current level.
Performance:

PEs have in general performed disappointingly relative to

4

their economic potential or relative to the economic motivations which might
have spawned them.

Their performance has perhaps not been any better with

respect to other social goals, even though such an assessment cannot be made
with precision, given the relative lack of framework, data and analysis.
The simplest indicators o~ PE performance are their profit and loss
·accounts.

Using these, several studies have shown that the aggregate prof- -

itability of PEs has lagged behind that of the private sector.

2

More dis-

The persistence of poor

aggregated studies support similar conclusions.

financial returns has scuttled one main aim of creating PEs, that their sur
pluses

would contribute

economy.

to

development

efforts

in other

parts

of

the

In addition, EE external borrowings have been significant and have

contributed to the current debt problems of LDCs.

3

Concerning the performance of PEs on criteria other than financial
ones, the prevailing opinion (which we share) is that performance on socioeconomic criteria has been below expectations.

It has been widely noted,

for instance, that PEs have created very little direct employment because of
their typically high capital intensity, and that induced employment creation has perhaps also been insubstantial.

Further, a common argument sup-

porting PEs has been that, since there are very few instruments for income
redistribution in LDCs, the pricing of the outputs of some of the PEs can
serve to redistribute income.
ever,

to

such an approach.

4

There are natural economic limitations, howAlso,

given the waste and inefficiencies

associated with typical PEs, it is unlikely that any significant redistribu
tion to the poor has actually taken place through this mechanism.
A highly visible aspect of PEs in most LDCs is that a number of enter
prises have continued to operate even though they are imposing, and would

5

continue to impose, large costs on the economy.

At one extreme, there are

PEs where abandoning the enterprise would be better for the economy even if
all present employees continued receiving their compensation for their re
maining work life; that is, the value of the output of such PEs does not
even cover the non-wage costs of operations.
Given the importance of PEs in LDCs and the level of dissatisfaction·
with their performance, it is not surprising that an extensive debate has
One obvious reaction has

taken place on how to deal with these problems.

been that the existing PEs should be divested through various means such as
privatization and plant closing and no fresh investment should be put into
existing or new PEs.
cumstances.

This reaction has obvious justifications in many cir

Yet, given the political economy of most LDCs, it is unlikely

that such an approach would find wide acceptance.

5

Other approaches have aimed at policy reforms at different levels.

At

the economy-wide level, for instance, it has been argued that external trade
and domestic credit_ policies should be altered so that PEs not only receive
economically relevant signals but also the costs of PEs become explicit
rather than being partly hidden, as is often the case at present.

At the

industry level, it has been argued that PEs should face more extensive pri
vate competition, domestic as well as external.

Some studies have indicated

the need for enterprise-specific reforms; in particular, reforms concerning
the degree and nature of., autonomy of PEs from government control, .and re-,
forms concerning the staffing and structure of PE management.
The proposals which we discuss later have a somewhat different emphasis
in that they are aimed at influencing the economic premises and the disci
plinary environment under which PE investment is undertaken.

Our proposals

6

are thus not in conflict with, nor a substitute for, the ongoing need for
reforms of the type described above.

In fact the pressure for undertaking

certain types of reforms (particularly, enterprise-specific reforms) might
well be strengthened by the presence of incentive pre-commitments.

II.

NATURE OF LOSSES UNDER PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

To understand the sources of poor performance of PEs, we find it useful
to subdivide the efficiency or welfare losses into three broad categories:
(i)

Traditional allocational inefficiencies from the wrong factor and
.

pro d uct mix.
(ii)

6

X-inefficiencies that arise, essentially, from lack of motiva-

tion or effort to use economic opportunities as effectively as they might
be used.

7

(iii)

Inability to shut down or scale back operations when losses are

incurred, due to the "soft budget constraint" laxity that the government
typically permits public enterprises. 8
Traditional allocational inefficiencies arising from the wrong factor
and product mix,
price theory.

of type (i) above, form a central theme of traditional

Trade distortions, effects of imperfect competition and mar

kets, tax and subsidy distortions, and effects of incorrect price setting
are all familiar subjects falling in this category.
forces

In many cases,

the

generating these inefficiencies are economy-wide or industry-wide

government policies, rather than enterprise specific policies. Most attempts
by economists to understand efficiency losses in LDCs and elsewhere have
focused on these areas.
We in no way desire to minimize losses of this traditional sort.

In

7

many specific instances inefficiency losses of type (i) have been shown to
be substantial.

But our belief is that losses of type (i) are usually less

important in practice than losses of type (ii) or (iii).

This is because

inefficiency losses of type (i) are quadratic or second-order in a well de
fined sense,

9

which in many practical cases means losses of not overwhelming

. de. 10
magnitu
X-inefficiency losses are also fairly well known.

Although it is dif

ficult to make precise estimates of the magnitude of these type (ii) losses,
arguably they are substantially larger than type (i) losses are likely to
be.

Leibenstein (1981) cites studies whose figures suggest that the magni

tude of X-inefficiency losses at any one time in the United States may be
between 20 to 40 percent of net national product.

These numbers seem high,

but even if they are somewhat off the mark, inefficiency of type (ii) is
likely to be a more serious matter than inefficiency of type (i) because of
the difference between first- and second-order losses.

The differences in

organizational motivation or effort (primarily due to differences in incen
tive mechanisms) are held by some to be a major cause of the large differ
ences

in productivity which

alternative economic systems.

have

been

observed

across

countries

with

11

The third type of inefficiency, due to de facto public project irre
versibility,

is

probably least well understood in development economics

· because much of the technical literature is .recent (typically •involving
stochastic diffusion processes), and it has been applied mostly to situations with well-developed capital markets.

Yet these type (iii) ineffi-

ciency losses, we believe, are likely to be the largest in magnitude of the
three classes enumerated above.

As we show later, it is not uncommon to
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find that with even moderate levels of uncertainty, the opportunity value
of project reversibility can be surprisingly large, and an

investment rule

that ignores it will be grossly in error.
A primary source of inefficiency of type (iii) is that workers, man
agers and bureaucrats view themselves as having acquired various kinds of
de facto property rights to continued employment (typically within the same
enterprise) once they have been employed in a particular PE.

These workers

and managers, then, impose significant political costs on the government if
it were to attempt to deny or curtail their employment property rights.

The

resulting political costs are sufficiently large for the government that it
tends to bail out failing PEs even though the resulting costs may sometimes
be enormous.

III.

VALUE OF INCENTIVE PRE-COMMITMENTS

If one asks the general question why losses of the kinds described
above occur in PEs,' the almost universal answer is that there are either no
incentives or wrong incentives to avoid such losses.

The lack of a payment

or reward system linked to profitability breeds apathy and vested interest
in the status quo.

Without motivation to seek and maintain high levels of

profitability, traditional allocational inefficiencies of type (i) and in
sufficient effort leading to type (ii) inefficiency are bound to arise. Once
pay and job security are insured more or less independently of economic
performance, it is politically very difficult to shut down or scale back a
failing enterprise, giving rise to type (iii) inefficiency.
The need to
evident.

introduce

appropriate incentives

is,

therefore,

self

We believe that this task can be more easily achieved if a funding
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agency is in a position to negotiate and impose pre-commitments for incen
tive mechanisms, at the very beginning of project funding, as a not unreas
onable pre-condition for receiving the loan and support.

In particular, it

would be useful to introduce two types of pre-commitments:

(a) a profit-

sharing pre-commitment stipulating that a non-negligible part of the compen
sation of managers and workers would be systematically linked .to enterprise.
performance, and (b) a liquidation pre-commitment stipulating that the pub
lic enterprise will be liquidated (through the sale of assets and control)
if its cumulative performance at pre-specified dates in the future is not
above certain threshold levels.
There has been little or no systematic analysis or evaluation in the
past of the idea that a poorly performing PE should be automatically liqui
dated according to a pre-specified schedule.

In contrast, the general idea

that the compensation of employees should be made sensitive to an enter1y not new. 12
.
. ob vious
. ' per f ormance is
prises

however,

A novel aspect of our proposal,

is the idea that performance-related incentive schemes should be

employed as pre-conceived components of project formulation and implementation.
In the next two subsections, we discuss how pre-commitments for incentive mechanisms would help
public enterprises.

ameliorate the basic efficiency problems of

The bottom line summary is that it is possible to think

of many reasons why these ·pre-commitments can improve PE performance~· while·;
by contrast,

it is difficult to envision scenarios under which such pre

commitments can have significant deleterious effects on PE performance.
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A.

Benefits from Profit-Sharing Pre-Commitments
The theoretical literature concerning the effects of profit sharing on

. fairy
. 1 sparse. 13
work effort is

On the one hand, there is the commonly made

observation that when workers' pay contains a component tied to output or
profitability, it is bound to increase work effort because increased effort
is automatically rewarded by increased pay.

Offsetting this claim is the

notion that gain sharing is unlikely to significantly increase effort in
multi-worker situations because the effect of any one worker's increased
effort is diluted.

Also, there is the idea that if profit sharing was such

a good method of motivating workers we would see more of it.

These criti

cisms, in turn, have been countered by pointing to important externality
effects.

As an example, it can be shown that the positive effects of gain

sharing on effort in a multi-worker setting are reinforced in a repeated
situation where workers can influence, directly or indirectly, each other's
level of effort.

On the whole, this literature raises some of the relevant

issues but, as is typical in theoretical economic debates, it does not pro
vide definitive answers.
On the empirical side, there is some indication that profit sharing is
associated with increased productivity and profitability.

Although it is

difficult to summarize succinctly the results of well over a dozen studies
based on different samples and methodologies, the following generalization
seems fair.

It is· typical to find a· significant• raw correlation,,.between

profit sharing and various signs of a firm's good health, like profitability
and productivity.

When other variables like capital stock, size, etc. are

controlled for in the regressions, the degree of association weakens.

With

these other factors being included as independent variables in the regres-
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sions, profit sharing continues to be significantly associated with increas
ed productivity and profitability in some studies, while the association is
statistically insignificant in others.

However, no studies we have read

find a statistically significant negative association between profit sharing
and productivity or profitability.
Moving to the .next issue, profit sharing might help to reduce ineffi
ciencies due to project irreversibility.

This is because the major consti

tuency opposed to scaling back unprofitable public enterprises is the work
force, which loses jobs that typically have much higher private economic
value (including better pay) than the next best alternative.

The job loss

issue transcends the immediate work force, because there are regional em
ployment multipliers.

If pay has responded automatically to profitability,

it has already been lowered (or raised) in some proportion to how badly (or
well) the enterprise has been performing.

In poorly performing enterprises,

thus, there will be less political will to oppose scaling back, or the scal
ing back may even occur automatically in extreme cases due to natural labor
attrition.
A cynic might ask the following question:

if government authorities

lacked the political will to make pay cuts and scale back operations in the
first place when the enterprise is doing poorly, and this was a prime cause
of the problem, why should profit sharing make any difference?

The answer

is that there can be a world of difference between a pre-condition-that all
parties agreed, on beforehand, and an action that can be interpreted as an
arbitrary change in the rules of the game.

Suppose that the pre-commitment

to profit sharing is part of the loan package, that many or most loan pack
ages of this sort contain such a provision, and that all employees must sign
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on to this provision when they sign on to a job in the initially-better
paying public enterprise.

The lower pay that comes with poor performance is

then part of the game--government authorities can then legitimately claim
that they never could have gotten the loan package in the first place unless
they had agreed to ·play by these rules.

The acceptance of such rules is

strengthened the more other players play by them.
B.

Value of Liquidation Flexibility
The primary role of a liquidation pre-commitment, in our view, is that

it introduces reversibility into public projects; that is, it makes it pos
sible to a greater degree for the society to save on future costs by terminating a poorly performing PE.

Since the value of such flexibility is

likely to be quite large, and since this topic is somewhat unfamiliar in the
context of LDC public enterprises, we present an explicit calculation of the
order of magnitude of the economic gain from reversibility.

Our analysis

is based on a highly stylized model which permits a closed-form solution of
the "reversibility premium."

The qualitative results will not be signifi

cantly altered if the model is extended to more complicated cases (for which
one would need to calculate numerical solutions).

The underlying methodol

ogy of working with stochastic diffusion equations is rather typical,

14

although the application to calculating the appropriate cost-benefit cri
teria in a project setting has not yet to our knowledge been accomplished
elsewhere.
Specifically, we work out a comparison between two investment alternatives--one of which is irreversible and the other partly reversible.
.
.
15
a 1 ternatives
are b ase d on two proJects.

ible.

These

One of the projects is irrevers-

This means that once this project is started, it cannot be stopped
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and must be run through to completion.

Suppose that the relevant annual

discount rate for cost benefit comparisons is r.

Let the expected net pres

ent discounted value of the irreversible project be denoted V, assumed to be
positive.

Thus, from an expected value point of view, the irreversible pro

ject can be treated as equivalent to a hypothetical infinitely lived project
having the constant net annual flow value F - Vr.
The other project is reversible.

This means that this project can be

stopped at any time it is deemed economically desirable.

To pose the issue

sharply, we suppose that only one of the two projects at a time can be
undertaken (such a condition might come about naturally because of underlying constraints).

Then the two investment alternatives are:

(1) to go

with the irreversible project forever, or (2) to start with the reversible
project and go with it unless and until some sufficiently bad outcomes are
revealed to cause a switch to the irreversible alternative.
Our aim is to calculate the "option value" of the inherent flexibility
which the second alternative delivers compared with the first.

That is, we

seek to know what difference reversibility has on traditional cost-benefit
criteria.

Heuristically, we would like to know how much less than their

reversible project can the reversible project be allowed to pay, and still
make it more attractive to start off, and continue with,
project.

the reversible

This difference is a measure of the option value of the reversi

bility per se.
Now, suppose that the.reversible project has the following form.once it
is initiated.

The net income flow follows a random walk·with zero drift and

annual standard deviation u.

This means that if the income flow at the cur

rent time is X, the distribution of income flow t years hence is normally
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distributed with mean X and standard deviation

u/t.

If the reversible pro

ject is chosen initially, then one has the option of bailing out of the
project if X declines by "too much" over time.

If the irreversible project

is initially selected, then the clock never starts running on the reversible
project and the irreversible project goes on.
Under the second investment alternative (that is, when the reversible
project is initially selected), it can be shown that the optimal stopping
policy which maximizes expected present discounted value has the following
intuitive form.

The reversible project has a reservation price P associated

with it such that this project should be chosen over the irreversible pro
ject if and only if X > P.

In other words, if at time zero X(O)

~

P, then

If at time zero X(O) > P then the re-

the irreversible project is chosen.

versible project is chosen initially and continued at any time t so long as
X(t) > P.

At the first instant

T

when X(T) - P, the reversible project is

terminated and the irreversible project is initiated.
The next logic_al question is:

(1)

what is P?

It turns out that

P = F - a/_fir

That is, the reservation price P of the reversible project is the difference
between the

a/./2r.

"certainty equivalent" F and the "flexibility option value"

The option value of a given reversible project measures its incre-

mental worth over the hypothetical irreversible alternative of receiving the
certainty equivalent income forever.

The option value is directly propor~·

tional to the annual standard deviation a 1 which parameterizes the degree
of uncertainty in the difference between the flexible and inflexible op
tions.

When a reversible project is available, it is chosen with a premium
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that increases in proportion with a because the larger is a the larger is
the chance of randomly drifting toward a desirably high value of X within a
relatively short period of time.

Hence, the higher is a the more should

the project maker be inclined to invest in the reversible project even
though it is currently paying a lower income than the comparable irrevers
ible project, because information will be revealed relatively quickly, and
if the reversible project does not drift up in value toward the irreversible
project, it could always be terminated in favor of the irreversible pro
ject.16

Equation (1) also shows that the desirability of the reversible

project is inversely proportional to the discount rate r.
simple.

The reason is

With a low enough discount rate, the project selector cannot afford

not to initially invest in the reversible project (primarily to see whether
it drifts up in value to be comparable with or better than the irreversible
project) because there is always the option of shifting to the irreversible
project if the reversible project turns out badly.
The following calculation gives some idea of the orders of magnitude
involved.

Suppose the annual standard deviation, a, of the reversible pro

ject is made higher by a dollar.

Then how much lower can the lowest value

of the annual flow from the reversible project be, and yet leave it profit
able not to replace the reversible project with the irreversible project.
From equation (1), the answer is seen to be 1//2r.
this value is $3.16.

When r - 5% per annum,

When r - 10% per annum, this tradeoff value is $2.24.

With numbers like these, it should be easy to appreciate ·why- the standard
cost-benefit criteria may be seriously distorted when they .do not take into
proper account the value of reversibility in a project, which is likely to
be considerably higher than is commonly appreciated.
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Before concluding, it might be useful to comment briefly on the incentive effects of liquidation pre-commitments.

Though there do not exist

theoretical or empirical studies which permit a quantitative assessment of
the incentive effects in different circumstances, it appears to us a reason
able presumption that those effects of liquidation pre-commitments which
might raise the productivity of workers and managers (such as the fear of
project shut down motivating employees towards greater productivity)

are

likely to outweigh those other effects which might lower productivity (for
instance, a reduction in job-specific learning due to the fear of job loss).
Liquidation pre-commitments can also have some desirable indirect effects on project design and implementation.

For instance, often there are

political pressures on project authorities to choose an uneconomic location
or an uneconomic technology.

Such political pressures are unlikely to dis

appear, but we suspect that they will be weakened in the presence of liquid
ation pre-commitments.

A different kind of indirect effect of liquidation

pre-commitment is that it might encourage a more open and extensive discussion, ex-ante, of the downside of a proposed public investment.

In this

process, the project agency as well as the lending agency might become more
aware of those aspects of project design, financing and institutional cap
abilities which are central to the future performance of the project.
C.

Implications for Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
The idea underlying social cost-benefit analysis is simple.

A project

is viewed as a perturbation in the economy, and the overall cost-benefit is
calculated by imputing the economic or social value to each of the conse
quences

of

exchange).

17

the

project

(for

In practice,

instance,

on outputs,

inputs

and

foreign

the typical approach to dealing with project
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uncertainty has been to do sensitivity analysis with respect to variables
such as the shadow wage rate, shadow exchange rate and international prices.
From the point of view of this paper, social cost-benefit analysis can
be turned into a more active and potent tool for improving the overall return from public investments.

It can be used to calculate the value of

liquidation pre-commitment by comparing scenarios under which the project
turns out to perform poorly but cannot be liquidated to those scenarios
under which there is a substantial probability of the same project being
liquidated.

Our earlier analysis indicates that the net gains from revers

ibility can be large. What social cost-benefit analysis can do is to impart
precision to the magnitude of these gains for specific projects.

Likewise,

the scope of cost-benefit analysis can be enlarged to assess how the rate of
return on a project might be affected by different profit-sharing commitments.
Actually, the mere requirement that a project evaluation report should
include an explicit discussion of the reasons why the project might under
perform, what are the likely associated costs, and what is to be done about
it, will bring some general pressure to deal with these issues more honest
ly.

More specific calculations from cost-benefit analysis can be used not

only to assess the economic value of pre-commitments, but also to determine
the magnitude of preferential treatment to be given to projects which
to build in incentive pre-commitments.

agree

In this sense, the modifications in

cost-benefit··analysis suggested here.are not only of potentially first-order
magnitude, but also their results have a direct implication on the condi
tionality of project funding.
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IV.
A.

OPERATIONALIZATION

Inducements
Perhaps there is no better way to encourage incentive pre-commitments

than to make them attractive to project authorities.

A lending agency can

achieve this by adopting a policy of the kind that projects with such pre
commitments will have to face less stringent hurdles such as a smaller eco
nomic rate of return required for funding.

A similar effect can be achieved

by making the softness of the loan (that is, the subsidy element in the rate
of interest and the ease of repayment schedule) dependent on whether and to
what extent a project agreement incorporates incentive pre-commitments.
Though the above proposals are more applicable to new projects and in
vestments,

a similar approach may be feasible to some extent for those

ongoing projects which have future economic potential and which are in need
of substantial borrowing and expansion.

On the other hand, no matter how

desirable in principle it might be to introduce incentive mechanisms in
other ongoing projects, we believe it will be much more difficult to per
suade the project authorities to do this because of the existing implicit
promise not to threaten job security or pay.
the

present

paper

has

placed

so

much

This is the basic reason why

emphasis

on

incorporating

pre

commitments as political "rules of the game" that are agreed upon right from
the beginning of a project.
International organizations can also use their leverage, to some ex
tent, in policy dialogues to encourage a-more general use of-incentive pre
commitments (for instance, the use of pre-commitments in projects funded by
domestic public sources).

This might in fact be more attractive than some

other public enterprise reforms which have been discussed in the past.

For
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instance, reforms concerning the degree and nature of autonomy of public
enterprises are not only difficult to specify with any precision, but they
are also difficult to negotiate and monitor for an outside agency.

The

changes in the project approval procedure suggested here, by contrast, are
easier to implement,

even though such changes are not a substitute for

other reforms.
B.

Performance Criteria
Since incentive pre-commitments entail that specific actions be under

taken contingent upon enterprise performance, it is necessary to address the
question how PE performance should be measured.

This question has been

debated extensively in centrally planned economies and, to some extent, in
LDCs, even though the typical context of past discussions has been the ex
post evaluation of enterprise performance for such purposes as auditing. 18
The basic source of controversy in devising a method for evaluation of
a PE's performance is as follows.

There is not that much disagreement on

the set of potential performance indicators

(such as private and public

profitability, cost-effectiveness, service quality, R+D, secondary employ
ment generation) which might reflect various aspects of overall performance.
What is inherently controversial is how to measure indicators which are
qualitative (such as service quality), whether to use only a few or many
indicators, and how to weigh different indicators to arrive at a single,
scalar, measure of overall performance.
Such controversies should not be surprising -because there are several
inescapable trade-offs involved.

As one example, simplicity and clarity are

more easily achieved if a few, relatively unambiguous indicators (particu
larlarly those reflecting financial profitability) are uniformly employed

20

across most enterprises.

Among the virtues of such an approach are that it

provides clearer signals (that is, everyone has a clearer understanding of
the government's expectations concerning pre-commitments), it reduces the
possibilities

of ex-post

evaluation method,

disputes

concerning the

interpretation of the

it imparts a greater consistency in the evaluation of

different types of enterprises

(and thereby reduces the possibilities of

favoritism and capriciousness), and it is less demanding on administrative
resources.

On the other hand,

such an approach may not capture the legi-

timate special circumstances which apply to different PEs, and can thus run
into conflict with the perception of fairness across enterprises operating
under different market conditions and under different policy environments.

19

As a result, it is not possible to devise in practice a "perfect" method for
. evaluating a PE' s performance, even though such a method may be. desirable
and theoretically feasible.

20

But at the same time, we believe that it is

not necessary to find a perfect method.

In fact, an overextended debate

about the method o~ evaluating PE performance can easily become counterpro
ductive.

There are at least two reasons for this.

First, in many circumstances, there is a strong correlation among major
indicators of an enterprise's performance.

That is, if one major indicator

(say, financial profitability) is showing a low performance for a particular
enterprise, then it is more likely to be the case than not that some other
major indicator (say, service quality) also exhibits low performance.

One

consequence of such overlaps among major· indicators is that the marginal
usefulness of adding one more indicator to the set of indicators on which
the evaluation is based declines, whereas the corresponding costs increase,
as the number of indicators in the set increases.
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Second, it is operationally better to base incentive mechanisms on some
reasonable measures of performance (theoretically crude though they might be
for the reasons stated above) than not to have incentive mechanisms at all.
That is, the "imperfections" of measurement criteria should not be used as
an excuse not to encourage incentive mechanisms and accountability as a part
of the project approval process.
ing incentive mechanisms

This is because the social gains from hav

(which we discussed earlier) would in general

compensate for the crudeness of performance measures.
C.

Institutional Mechanism

Implementation of incentive pre-commitments would require the institu
tional mechanism and capability to undertake routine ex-post evaluation of
projects.

To a very limited degree, the experience of ex-post evaluation

exists in some LDCs and multilateral organizations.

Sample evaluations have

been undertaken, for instance, for the purpose of auditing and for learning
.
21
f rom past experience.

More recently, there have also been some limited

attempts to evaluat·e the sustainability of a sample of projects (that is,
whether a particular project is capable of generating a satisfactory flow of
net economic benefits).
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To implement pre-commitments, however, there would

be a need for a more comprehensive and a more clearly defined institutional
process of ex-post evaluation.

While such extensive ex-post evaluation is

desirable by itself, it should be recognized that a certain extra potential
for controversy is inherent in the task of implementing pre-commitments.
This is because the·-judgment · on whether or not a particular ·pre-commitment
is being satisfied will have direct operational consequences. Yet, the over
all controversy associated with the consequent remedial actions could be
significantly less

than

that

in the

case where corresponding remedial

22

actions are attempted without pre-commitments of the kind discussed in this
paper.
Finally, a central objective of incentive schemes is to alter the as
sumptions under which workers and managers of PEs operate and to change--to
the extent possible--the economic environment of public enterprises.

This

objective might be more easily achieved if extensive publicity is given on
an ongoing basis to the relative performance of public enterprises and to
the government's responses to different levels of performance.

Such public

ity can serve as an important source of motivation to the top management of
PEs.

More importantly, PEs operate under a complex political environment

where public support is important for the success of most policies which
concern worker compensation and employment.

Such support is more likely to

be forthcoming if the public is aware of what the policy is and how it is
being implemented.

V.
A.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

Credibility of Implementation

There are many examples of LDC governments announcing policy changes
and then, under political pressure, altering the changes or reverting back
to earlier policy.
that:

Given such a track record, it is reasonable to argue

(i) even if pre-commitments are undertaken for a set of projects, a

government may invent ways to circumvent their implementation, and (ii) even
if. a, government intends to_ implement a pre-commitment, .· this possibility
might not be taken seriously by employees and other interested parties and,
correspondingly, the incentive effects of the pre-commitment may be diluted.
These problems are simply a reflection of the political economy of the

23

public sector.

It is possible however that the presence of third parties

(in particular, multilateral organizations) can ameliorate such problems.
There are at least two reasons for this.

First, the presence of third par

ties might make it more desirable for the government to implement a pre
commitment, at least to the extent that the ongoing relationship with third
parties is considered valuable by the government.

Second, in those cases

where a government does wish to impose discipline on PEs, it might be helped
by the presence of third parties.

For instance, in its attempt to liquidate

a poorly performing PE, a government might find it desirable to emphasize
that its "hands are tied" by the existing pre-commitments.
B.

Manipulation by Managers

A reasonable question is whether the introduction of incentive pre
commitments would induce managers and employees of PEs to manipulate the en
vironment (for example, to seek greater protection from international compe
tition) so that the resulting economic outcome is worse than that without
pre-commitment.
eral reasons.

Conceptually this is possible, but it is unlikely,for sev
First, most of the manipulations which can potentially take

place, given the political setup, are perhaps already taking place. Second,
the presence of well-publicized pre-commitments might have an effect of
bringing a greater degree of public scrutiny to the demands exerted by
employees of the public sector which, in turn, may reduce the degree to
which these demands are satisfied.

Finally, even in the extreme case where

the government does not .intend· .to -take advantage of . the - disciplinary-oppor
tuni ties offered by pre-commitments, perhaps the worst that can happen is
that government policies would be altered to negate the potential positive
consequences of incentive mechanisms.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

Among reviews emphasizing different aspects are Baumol (1980), Floyd,
et al. (1984), Gillis, et al. (1983, Ch. 21), Jones (1982) and Nellis
(1986).

Also, it is not necessary for our purpose to be rigid about

the definition of a PE, because the main issues we emphasize apply to a
broad range of publicly invested and publicly controlled organizations
(except

perhaps

short-term public

creating infrastructure).

projects

devoted exclusively

to

For definitions of PEs, see Bohm (1981) and

Jones (1982).
2.

For instance, a recent summary based on a cross-country sample showed
that PEs have a

lower profitability than the corresponding private

enterprises in each of the eight industrial subsectors under consider
ation.
3.

See Ayub and Hegstad (1987, pp. 84 and 86).

A method to evaluate some of the macroeconomic consequences of PE per
formance is discussed in Floyd, et al. (1984).

4.

See Sah (1983)° for an analysis of the limitations on redistribution
through pricing or through taxation and subsidization of goods.

See

Sah (1986) for a more general analysis.
5.

For preliminary data showing that this is the case in many sub-Saharan
countries, see Nellis (1986).

For a discussion of some of the experi

ences of divestiture, see Berg (1985).
6.

See standard texts such as Varian (1984) and Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980).

7.

See Leibenstein (1976) for references.

8.

Kornai (1980) has written extensively about the effects of soft budget
constraints on state enterprises in Eastern European style economies.
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9.
10.

See Weitzman (1987) for a rigorous presentation of this argument.
As James Tobin has quipped in a somewhat different context:
a heap of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap."

"It takes

Among the earliest

studies of allocational efficiency losses are those of Harberger (1964,
1966).

Since then this matter has been empirically studied in a vari

ety of settings.
11.

A recent calculation of such differences in productivity is by Bergson
(1987) who shows that the output per worker in a sample of socialist
economies is lower by more than 25 percent compared to that in a sample
of western market economies, even after the outputs have been adjusted
for differences in capital and land per worker.

12.

It has been tried in some cases on a consistent basis, most recently
in South Korea, with success.

See Park (1986).

13.

See for example the summary in Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987).

14.

See Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Majd and Pindyck (1987) and McDonald
and Siegel (19~6).

15.

The analysis could be extended to several different projects.

16.

This result may appear somewhat counterintuitive in the sense that a
reversible project has greater relative premium if the uncertainty, a,
is larger.

The reason, as indicated above,

is that a larger a in-

creases the "optimal value" or "flexibility value" of starting with a
reversible project.

This and other qualitative results hold, in suit

ably modified form, even if the investment choice is based on expected
utility maximization under risk aversion rather than on expected value
maximization.
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17.

For recent reviews of cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation,
see Srinivasan (1982) and Dreze and Stern (1987).

18.

In the literature of centrally planned economies,

this is typically

referred to as the problem of "success indicators."

See, for example,

Berliner (1976) for discussion and further references.

For a recent

summary of the conventional economic difficulties in measuring public
sector output, see Stiglitz (1986, Ch. 7).
19.

Such an approach also does not deal adequately with the issue of basing
the performance measure on factors under a PE's control while stripping
out the effects of factors outside the PE's control.

The stripping of

some of the latter factors is possible and desirable (such as input and
output taxes and subsidies implicit in pricing policies) while it is
intrinsically difficult to do so for other factors

(such as conse

quences of government policies on technology imports).
20.

In principle, it is possible to measure the public profitability of a
PE based on shadow prices derived from social cost-benefit analysis.
However, the complexity of such a measure increases markedly especially
if the full general equilibrium effects are traced out.

Also, since

shadow prices depend on the underlying model of the economy, the needs
of contractual arrangements (e.g., clarity and standardization) would
require not only an articulation of the model, but also the retention
of the same model for several years.
21.

See World Bank (1986).

22.

See World Bank (1985).
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